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ARGUMENT
I.
THE NOTICE OF APPEAL
WAS NOT TARDILY FILED
Mrs. Nigohosian contends that the Notice of Appeal dated and entered on July 19,
2002 (R.1180-1181) was tardy because the decree of divorce was signed on June 18,
2002. This contention is based on a misreading of Rule 4, URAP, which requires a
Notice of Appeal to be filed "within thirty days after the date of entry of the judgment or
order appealed from." Rule 4, URAP. Although the divorce decree was apparently signed
on June 18, it was not "entered in registry of judgments" until June 20, 2002. (R.1180).l
The 30th day from June 20, 2002 is July 21, 2002, a Sunday. Whenever the date for filing
a document in an appellate court falls on a Sunday, "the period extends until the end of
next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday." Rule 22(a), URAP. Filing of
the notice on July 19, 2002 was well within the 30 day time limit. The Notice of Appeal
was not filed too late.

1

The decree bears a red stamp indicating it was "entered" on June 20. It also
bears a stamp indicating the date it was "filed". That date was June 19. Even
assuming the appeal time began to run on the date the decree was "filed" rather than
"entered," 30 days from that date was July 20, 2002 - a Saturday. Under the Rule, the
Notice of Appeal would not have been tardy if filed the following Monday. In fact,
however, it was filed on Friday, July 19. It was therefore timely even if the running of
the time limit was triggered by the date of "filing" rather than the date of "entry."
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II.
THE NOTICE OF APPEAL
WAS NOT PREMATURELY FILED.
Mrs. Nigohosian is correct in her assertion that post judgment motions are not ripe
for adjudication in an appellate court when not having been formally appealed from a trial
court. This appeal was filed by Mr. Nigohosian's trial counsel. Both the Notice of Appeal
and the Docketing Statement clearly indicate the intent to appeal from the Decree of
Divorce and supporting Findings and Conclusions.
Mr. Nigohosian's trial counsel withdrew while the appeal was pending. When his
current appeal counsel stepped in, he mistakenly assumed the appeal had been taken from
the trial court's denial of Mr. Nigohosian's Rule 59 and Rule 60 motions. Based on that
erroneous assumption, the title page of his appeal brief in chief mistakenly indicates this
appeal is taken from the district court's Order Denying Motion For Relief From Judgment
entered on December 20, 2002.2 Also erroneous is a statement of one of the "Issues
Presented" found on page 5 of the appeal brief in chief. (Issue #3). Counsel apologizes
for the erroneous statements in his appeal brief based on his mistaken assumption.

2

Actually, the motion for relief which that order disposed of had not even been
filed until nearly five months after the Notice of Appeal was filed.
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The fundamental error this appeal seeks to correct appears in the decree itself and in
the findings supporting it. Any subsequent ruling or findings by the district in the context
of post decree motions are essentially immaterial to this appeal. However, since concerns
over the post decree motions have been raised, this reply brief will address them now.
Mr. Nigohosian's trial counsel filed her Rule 60 motion for relief on the same day
and at the same time she filed her Notice of Appeal. (Cf filing stamp on R. 1161 and R.
1180). It is true that a trial court is generally divested of jurisdiction over a case while it is
under advisement on appeal. White v. State, 795 P.2d 648, 650 (1990). There are
exceptions to that general rule. Id. at 650, fn. 8. See also Saunders v. Sharp, 818 P.2d
574, 577 (Utah App. 1991). This Court, in fact, has expressly declared that a trial court
has jurisdiction to consider a Rule 60(b) motion while an appeal is pending and enter
denial if appropriate. If grant of the motion is appropriate, counsel may then request an
order of remand from the appellate court for entry of the order granting relief. Baker v.
Western Sur. Co., 757 P.2d 878, 880-81 (Utah App. 1988). Under Baker, the district
court's consideration of the Rule 60 motion for relief while this appeal was pending was
not necessarily inappropriate. Its denial of the motion had no real impact on or relevance
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to the then pending appeal.3
Rule 4(b), URAP, provides that a Notice of Appeal filed before the disposition of a
Rule 59 Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment "shall have no effect" and that a new Notice
of Appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order of
the trial court disposing of the motion. That rule, however, is not applicable because the
Rule 59 motion filed on behalf of Mr. Nigohosian by his prior counsel was not filed until
nearly five months after the Notice of Appeal was filed in the district court and nearly two
months after the related docketing statement was filed in this Court. Arguably, the district
court had no jurisdiction to consider the Rule 59 motion while this appeal was pending.
See White v. State, supra. Significantly, Rule 4(d) does not apply to a Rule 60 motion for
relief.
In short, this appeal is proper and does not violate any provision of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure.

3

That denial, which came at the conclusion of an October 25, 2002 hearing (long
after the docketing statement before this Court had been filed) was never even reduced to
a formal, written order, without which an appeal from that ruling could not have been
taken.
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III.
THE FAILURE OF MR. NIGOHOSIAN'S TRIAL COUNSEL TO
OBJECT TO THE FORM OF THE DECREE, FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS BEFORE THEY WERE SIGNED DOES NOT
PRECLUDE MR. NIGOHOSIAN FROM APPEALING FROM
ENTRY OF THOSE DOCUMENTS ON THE GROUNDS THAT
THEY DO NOT REFLECT THE PARTIES' STIPULATION.
Mr. Nigohosian's prior counsel explained to the district court why she did not
object to the form of the decree, findings and conclusions Mrs. Nigohosian's counsel had
submitted to the court:
Ms. O'Hara: I was not aware that Mr. Mclntyre submitted
them. He sent me a letter, and I understood from
our conversation that he was waiting for some
documents from me before he submitted them.
(R. 1415 at 5). After acknowledging that the objection period had run, Mr. Nigohosian's
counsel told the court: "I didn't know the court had the documents." (R. 1415 at 5).
The documents submitted to the court for entry were supposed to have been a
reflection of the stipulation the parties had actually reached several months earlier, which
was spread on the record on February 1, 2002. (R. 1402, 1-20). If the documents as
submitted had truly reflected the parties' stipulation and had been endorsed by Mr.
Nigohosian's trial counsel, Mrs. Nigohosian's waiver contention might have merit. Here,
however, the documents were not endorsed in the customary way ("approved as to form"
-5-

or "approved as to form and substance"). On the contrary, they were submitted to the
court not only without endorsement by Mr. Nigohosian's counsel but, apparently, without
counsel's actual awareness that they were being submitted to the court. Whether the trial
court believed or disbelieved prior counsel's assertion that she was not aware the
documents had been submitted to the court for signing and entry, the whole question of
notice and knowledge of submission is irrelevant to the fundamental basis for appeal.4
The contention that a party's failure to object to proposed findings precludes a
subsequent appeal was made and rejected in Dugan v. Jones, 724 P.2d 955, 956 (Utah
1986). There is simply no legal basis for Mrs. Nigohosian's contention that Mr.
Nigohosian's failure to object to the decree, findings and conclusions is fatal to his appeal.
Both common sense and case authority indicate the contrary.

4

That basis is that the decree, findings and conclusions contain provisions
inconsistent with the terms agreed upon in open court.
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IV.
THE DECREE AND SUPPORTING FINDINGS
AND CONCLUSIONS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH
CRITICAL TERMS OF THE DIVORCE STIPULATION
ENTERED ON THE RECORD FEBRUARY 1, 2002.

A. Future Alimony Obligation.
When the parties reached agreement during the final pretrial conference, there was
absolutely no indication that the amount of Mr. Nigohosian's monthly alimony obligation
would escalate when his sons attained majority. The parties' actual intent was that it
would not. At most, the stipulation spread on the record lacks completeness and clarity on
the matter. The decree, findings and conclusions submitted by Mrs. Nigohosian's counsel
seek to exploit that incompleteness and unclarity.
The parties' agreement as to Mr. Nigohosian's future alimony obligation was
spread on the record by Mrs. Nigohosian's counsel during the February 1, 2002 conference
as follows:
Mr. Mclntyre:

We have agreed to a total amount of child
support and alimony in the sum of $1,250 . . .

(R. 1402 -17, lines 10-11). Unfortunately, this constitutes the entire statement of the
parties' intent. Significantly, this statement does not indicate Mr. Nigohosian's monthly
-7-

alimony obligation would escalate or that his total support obligation would remain at
$1,250 per month after his sons reached adulthood. However, the decree, findings and
conclusions Mrs. Nigohosian's counsel drew up and submitted to the court attempt to
create that impression. Paragraph 16 of the divorce decree states:
Commencing February 1, 2002, respondent is ordered to pay
alimony to petitioner which is calculated by finding the
difference between $1,250 per month and the monthly child
support obligation, which alimony obligation is presently
calculated at $535 per month, for 25 years commencing on
May 1, 1998 and ending on April 30, 2023. (R. 1138).
The corresponding Conclusion of Law No. 17, is verbatim identical to this
provision of the decree except that phrase "respondent is ordered to paiy" reads
"respondent should be ordered to pay". (R. 1127). The corresponding finding of fact
(Finding No. 23), however, attempts to go further in creating the impression that escalation
in alimony was intended. It states:
The parties stipulated that the amount of alimony should be
calculated by finding the difference between $1,250 per month
and the monthly child support obligation so that the total sum
of alimony and child support total [sic] $1,250 per month. .. .
(R. 1131).
Mr. Nigohosian and his trial counsel understood that his alimony obligation would
not escalate. That understanding is reflected in the proposed amended findings,
-8-

conclusions and decree Mr. Nigohosian's trial counsel submitted to the court.

(R. 1230

at 1J21; 1234 at f 13; 1240 at f 12). It is also reflected in the statement Mr. Nigohosian's
trial counsel made to the district court on October 25, 2002.

(R. 1415 at 34-35).

This Court should declare unsuccessful, if not inappropriate, the attempt to create
an impression that the parties had agreed to an escalation in alimony. The decree and
supporting finding and conclusion are at most ambiguous as to whether the amount of
monthly alimony is to escalate when the monthly support child support decreases and
ultimately disappears. That ambiguity should be resolved against the drafter.

B. Past Support Arrearages.
At the final pretrial conference held before the district court on February 1, 2002,
the parties unequivocally agreed that Mr. Nigohosian's support arrearages as of February
1, 2002 would be voided in consideration for the award to Mrs. Nigohosian of the equity
in the marital home and furnishings. This agreement was stated by Mrs. Nigohosian's
own counsel as follows:
[I]n exchange for her receiving the equity in the home and the
equity in the items that are in the residence, she would waive
any claim for alimony or child support arrearages . . . up to the
date of today's hearing.
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(R. 1415 at 2). This essential term was omitted from the findings, conclusions and decree
Mrs. Nigohosian's counsel submitted to the court for entry. After those submissions were
signed, the Office of Recovery Services incorrectly (based on the aforementioned critical
omission) concluded the arrearages were still owed and extracted payment of those
arrearages from Mr. Nigohosian's paychecks.
The errors created by the inaccurate and ambiguous provisions in the decree,
findings and conclusions should be corrected by this Court. The divorce documents as
interpreted by the Office of Recovery Services do not reflect the parties' actual agreement.
It is well within the power and authority of this Court to order the correction of an
inaccurate recording of the intent of divorce litigants in their property settlement.

C.

Life Insurance Maintenance and Payment of All Outstanding Debts

The stipulation spread on the record and approved by the district court on February
1, 2002 did not include any requirement that Mr. Nigohosian maintain Mrs. Nigohosian as
the beneficiary of his life insurance policy nor did it include any agreement that Mr.
Nigohosian would be solely liable for all outstanding debts incurred by either of the
parties during the marriage. The decree and supporting findings and conclusions
submitted by Mrs. Nigohosian's counsel, however, include such provisions. (R. 1139,
-10-

f 18 and R. 1140, ^22). Such inclusions are gratuitous and were not authorized. They do
not reflect the agreed stipulation of the parties.

CONCLUSION
The Notice of Appeal was neither tardily nor prematurely filed. The failure of Mr.
Nigohosian's trial counsel to object to the form of the decree, findings and conclusions is
not fatal to the appeal. The decree and supporting findings and conclusions are
inconsistent with critical terms of the divorce stipulation entered on the record and do not
reflect the parties' true intent. This Court should correct the error. Mr. Nigohosian hereby
renews the specific relief request contained in his brief in chief. Mr. Nigohosian asks this
Court to remand the case to the district court with instructions to:
1.

Amend the decree and supporting documents to reflect that Mr.

Nigohosian's alimony obligation shall remain at $535 per month unless otherwise ordered
by the court following by a petition to modify.
2.

Amend the decree and supporting documents to include the parties'

agreement that Mr. Nigohosian's alimony and child support arrearages as of February 1,
2002 would be erased and voided in consideration for Mrs. Nigohosian's being awarded
the parties' equity in the home and its furnishings;
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3.

Amend the decree and supporting documents to delete the requirement that

Mr. Nigohosian maintain Mrs. Nigohosian as the beneficiary on his life insurance policy
and the requirement that he pay all outstanding debts incurred by the parties during the
marriage;
In the alternative to numbers 1 and 3, supra, Mr. Nigohosian asks that this Court
instruct the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the parties' true intent
as to the issues raised therein and, if it determines the parties did not reach an accord and
there was no "meeting of the minds" between them as to those issues, to reach an
appropriate decision on them, based on evidence presented to it.
Respectfully submitted this ^>& day of January, 2004.

Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson, P.C.
Attorneys for Appellant
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